Restructuring in the power industry is followed by splitting different parts and creating a competition between purchasing and selling sections. As a consequence, through an active participation in the energy market, the service provider companies and large consumers create a context for overcoming the problems resulted from lack of demand side participation in the market. The most prominent ch...

Currently, many socially responsible governments adopt economic incentives and deterrents to manage environmental impacts of electricity suppliers. Considering the Stackelberg leadership of the government, the government’s role in the competition of power plants in an electricity market is investigated. A one-population evolutionary game model of power plants is developed to study how their pro...

The paper studies on the core philosophy and algorithm of the designing economic mechanisms theory, a new algorithm of designing incentive compatible power market mechanisms is proposed, a generation side power market mechanism model which has features of inventive compatibility, informationally efficient and decentralized decision is constructed. The power market based on the designing economi...

This paper analyzes Markovian equilibria in a model of strategic lending where (i) agents cannot commit to long term contracts, (ii) contracts are incomplete, and (iii) incumbent lenders can coordinate their actions. The structure of the credit market keeps changing over time endogenously along every equilibium path. After a sequence of bad shocks the borrower in a competitive market accumulate...