In this article, we present the web of commitment methodology that allows us to specify the dialogical behavior of agents from the commitments that can be contracted between them and from the links that can exist between those commitments. At first, we present the DIAGAL agent communication language which is based on social commitments and dialogue games that are defined as structures regulatin...

Selective opening attacks against commitment schemes occur when the commitment scheme is repeated in parallel (or concurrently) and an adversary can choose depending on the commit-phase transcript to see the values and openings to some subset of the committed bits. Commitments are secure under such attacks if one can prove that the remaining, unopened commitments stay secret. We prove the follo...

Social commitments provide a powerful representation for modeling multi-agent interactions without relinquishing part of agents autonomy and flexibility. However, distinguishing between different but related types of conditional commitments, a natural frame of social commitments, is not considered yet. In this paper, we define a new logical language, CTL, which extends CTL with modalities to re...

We introduce the notion of hybrid trapdoor commitment schemes. Intuitively a hybrid trapdoor commitment scheme is a primitive which can be either an unconditionally binding commitment scheme or a trapdoor commitment scheme depending on the distribution of commitment parameters. Moreover, such two possible distributions are computationally indistinguishable. Hybrid trapdoor commitments are relat...

Selective opening attacks against commitment schemes occur when the commitment scheme is repeated in parallel and an adversary can choose depending on the commit-phase transcript to see the values and openings to some subset of the committed bits. Commitments are secure under such attacks if one can prove that the remaining, unopened commitments stay secret. We prove the following black-box con...

This paper investigates the use of high-level action languages for representing and reasoning about commitments in multiagent domains. The paper introduces the language Lmt with features motivated by the problem of representing commitments; in particular, it shows how Lmt can handle both simple commitment actions and complex commitment protocols. The semantics ofLmt provides a uniform solution ...

We report an experiment designed to test the influence of noisy commitments on efficiency in a simple bargaining game. We investigate two different levels of commitment reliability in a variant of the peasant-dictator game. Theoretical analysis suggests that the reliability of commitments in this game does not affect efficiency. We find that accurate commitments promote efficiency, as expected ...