We establish the existence of steady states in two classic matching and bargaining models with general trader asymmetries, search processes, and production functions. © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C78

This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases probability incumbent is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an stability reducing single-party majority and increasing instability governments when such not available. We interpre...

We investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions (frames) used when thinking about game. In our games action consists visual objects: each player must privately choose one, trying to match counterpart’s choice. propose a model where different player-types are aware attributes (hence, frames). One novelties an epistemic structure that allows players think new frames, after...

In this article we introduce a new axiom for bargaining solutions, named Proportional Concession Monotonicity (PCM), which imposes that no player benefit when all players collectively make proportional concessions with respect to their respective utopia values. We reconsider the leximin solution (Imai, 1983), and obtain an alternative characterization on the basis of PCM. JEL-Classification: C78

A bargaining solution based on the Rubinstein–Safra–Thomson ‘ordinal Nash’ outcome is investigated in the Peters–Wakker ‘revealed group preferences’ framework. Assuming non-expected utility preferences, necessary and sufficient conditions are stated on preference pairs in order for the solution to be well-defined and axiomatized uniquely. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classifica...

The best known equilibrium strategies of multiplayer bargaining define that the agreement is established at the first moment. In this paper two new subgame perfect Nash equilibria strategies are proposed, one in which the agreement moment is delayed for T > 1 periods and one other in which the bargaining proposals proceed endlessly. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78.

Using a repeat sales data set, this paper tests whether a single small seller can influence the selling price of their house. We find that this influence exists and that it dominates the influence of commonly-used market conditions. Since the estimated magnitude of this effect is much higher than expected, we verify the estimate using several supplementary tests. JEL: C78, D80, R21, R31

We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse. JEL Classification: C78, D81

We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of which contains three voters and six (not necessarily distinct) alternatives, and one of which contains four voters and four (not necessarily distinct) alternatives. We also provide an efficient way to decide whether a preference profile is single-crossing. JEL Classification: D71, C78.

In the context of the stable roommates problem, it is shown that acyclicity of preferences is equivalent to the existence of symmetric utility functions, i.e. the utility of agent i when matched with j is the same as j’s utility when matched with i. © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc. JEL classification: C78