This note provides a new proof of the non–emptiness of the fuzzy core in a pure exchange economy with finitely many agents. The proof is based on the concept of (Π, β)–balanced core for games without side payments due to Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003). JEL classification codes: D51, C71.

A multi-choice game is a generalization of a cooperative game in which each player has several activity levels. This note provides several characterizations of the extended Shapley value as proposed by Derks and Peters (1993). Three characterizations are based on balanced contributions properties, inspired by Myerson (1980). Classification Number (J.E.L.): C71

We introduce a core-based stability concept for networks with widespread externalities. The model is a generalisation of the recursive core for partition function form games. We present a simple example of a favour network and show that the core is nonempty when players must pay transfers to intermediaries. This simple setting also models economic situations such as airline networks. Subject cl...

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C71, C72, C78.

We follow the path initiated in Shapley (1971) and study the geometry of the core of convex and strictly convex games. We define what we call face games and use them to study the combinatorial complexity of the core of a strictly convex game. Remarkably, we present a picture that summarizes our results with the aid of Pascal’s triangle. JEL classification: C71.

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players’ preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty. JEL Clas...

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links. Since a network describes the interaction structure between agents, our allocation rule covers both bilateral and multilateral interactions. We provide a characterization of this rule in terms of well known axioms and compare it to other allocation rules in the literature. JEL classifications: A14; ...

We will introduce a generalization of the concept of cooperative game. First, we consider the set 3N of all the ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions. Next, we de...ne bicooperative games b : 3N ! R and we study the class of bisubmodular (bisupermodular) games. Journal of Economic Literature Classi...cation Number: C71.

We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents’ preferences are additive, no such rule exists. JEL Classification: C71, D63, D71.

In this paper we show that every finite-player game in characteristic function form obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors are bounded) possesses a farsighted von-Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. JEL Classification No.: C71, D71.