We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occurring out of equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications: C62—Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium D51—Exchange and Production Economies D58—Computable and Other Applied Gener...

The purpose of this paper is to give a global characterization of excess demand functions in a two period exchange economy with incomplete real asset markets. We show that continuity, homogeneity and Walras’ law characterize the aggregate excess demand functions on any compact price set which maintains the dimension of the budget set. JEL classification: D52, C62.

This paper considers a neoclassical optimal growth problem where the shock that perturbs the economy in each time period is potentially unbounded on the state space. Sufficient conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibria are derived in terms of the primitives of the model using recent techniques from the field of perturbed dynamical systems. Journal of Economic Literature C...

We consider Kyle’s market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally distributed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D82, G14.

We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated private valuations and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets. JEL Classification: C62, C72, D44, D82

I propose a simple simulation procedure for large games with multiple equilibria. The simulation procedure is based on a best-response dynamic. The implied equilibrium selection mechanism is intuitive: more stable equilibria are selected with higher probability. JEL Codes: C62, C72, C73

The paper proposes an Euler equation technique for analyzing the stability of differentiable stochastic programs. The main innovation is to use marginal reward directly as a Foster–Lyapunov function. This allows us to extend known stability results for stochastic optimal growth models, both weakening hypotheses and strengthening conclusions. JEL classification: C61; C62; O41

In this paper, we provide an alternative definition of NTU convexity, strongly ordinal convexity. We show that if a game is strongly ordinal convex, then any marginal worth vector is in the core, and any marginal contribution is increasing. Some economic examples satisfy this convexity. KeywordsCooperative game; Convex game; NTU game; Core; Supermodularity JEL classification codes: C62; D52; D53

Competitive equilibria are shown to exist in two-object exchange economies with indivisibilities and additive complementarities in agent valuations between objects, provided that complementarities are common across agents. We further investigate whether the competitive equilibrium can be obtained as an outcome of a simultaneous English-type auction mechanism under non-strategic (honest) bidding...