Using a dynamical network model of society, we show that cooperation is the norm in the Hawks-Doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. This is an interesting result, as standard theory for mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium. We di...

One of the most complicated decision making problems for managers is the evaluation of bank performance, which involves various criteria. There are many studies about bank efficiency evaluation by network DEA in the literature review. These studies do not focus on multi-level network. Wu (Eur J Oper Res 207:856–864, 2010) proposed a bi-level structure for cost efficiency at the first time. In t...

The multiobjective two person matrix game problem with fuzzy payoffs is considered in this paper. It is assumed that fuzzy payoffs are triangular fuzzy numbers. The problem is converted to several multiobjective matrix game problems with interval payoffs by using the $alpha$-cuts of fuzzy payoffs. By solving these problems some $alpha$-Pareto optimal strategies with some interval outcomes are o...

For two-player games of perfect information such as Checker, Chess, Go, etc., we introduce “uniqueness” properties. For any game position, we say roughly that it has a uniqueness property (or, a unique solution property) if a winning strategy (if it exists) is forced to be unique. Depending on the way that winning strategy is forced, a uniqueness property is classified as (bi-)weak, (bi-)strong...

We consider the following searching game: there are two players, say Questioner and Responder. Responder chooses a number x ∈ Sn = {1, 2, . . . , n}, Questioner has to find out the number x by asking bi-interval queries and Responder is allowed to lie at most two times throughout the game. The minimal number q(n) of bi-interval queries sufficient to find the unknown integer x is determined for ...

It takes two design goals as different game players and design variables are divided into strategy spaces owned by corresponding game player by calculating the impact factor and fuzzy clustering. By the analysis of behavior characteristics of two kinds of intelligent pigs, the big pig’s behavior is cooperative and collective, but the small pig’s behavior is noncooperative, which are endowed wit...

The Generalised Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) is a Nash game with the distinct feature that the feasible strategy set of a player depends on the strategies chosen by all her opponents in the game. This characteristic distinguishes the GNEP from a conventional Nash Game. These shared constraints on each player’s decision space, being dependent on decisions of others in the game, increases its ...