Non-cooperative bargaining is modeled as an extensive–form game with uncertain information and infinite actions. Its resolution is a long–standing open problem and no algorithm addressing uncertainty over multiple parameters is known. We provide an algorithm to solve bargaining with any kind of one–sided uncertainty. Our algorithm reduces a bargaining problem to a finite game, solves this last ...

We show that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.

Experiments with the ultimatum game—where one party can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a second party on how to split a pie—illustrate that conventional game theory has been wrong in its predictions regarding the simplest of bargaining settings: Even when one party has enormous bargaining power, she may be able to extract all the surplus from trade, because the second party will reject gro...

Bargaining is a basic game in economic practice. Cournot duopoly game is an important model in bargaining theory and is well studied in the literatures. Recently, asymmetry information [20] and incomplete information [19], limited individual rationality [2] and slightly altruistic equilibrium [10] are introduced into bargaining theory. And computational game theory also comes into being a new h...

We initiate a study of Nash bargaining games [Nas50] via combinatorial, polynomial time algorithms and we carry this program over to solving nonsymmetric bargaining games of Kalai [Kal77] as well. Since the solution to a Nash bargaining game is also the optimal solution to the corresponding convex program, this involves obtaining a combinatorial algorithm for the latter. This in turn can be vie...

W e analyze contracting behaviors in a two-tier supply chain system consisting of competing manufacturers and competing retailers. We contrast the contracting outcome of a Stackelberg game, in which the manufacturers offer take-itor-leave-it contracts to the retailers, with that of a bargaining game, in which the firms bilaterally negotiate contract terms via a process of alternating offers. Th...

Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatu...

Decision theory includes arbitration, bargaining and game theory, whose relationships to each other are not well-understood. This paper introduces a particular weighted arbitration operator and applies it to King Solomon’s dilemma and Nash’s original bargaining problem. These applications allow a more meaningful comparison of the three theories and show that arbitration provides a more natural,...

Recently, [8] defined the class of Linear Nash Bargaining Games (LNB) and obtained combinatorial, polynomial time algorithms for several games in this class. [8] also defines two natural subclasses within LNB, UNB and SNB, which contain a number of natural Nash bargaining games. In this paper we define three basic game theoretic properties of Nash bargaining games: price of bargaining, fairness...

The aim of this paper is to determine how the place of a player in a network of communications ̊ affects her bargaining power with respect to the others. We adapt the Rubinstein-Stahl two-player noncooperative bargaining game of alternating offers to the case of n players connected through a graph. We show that this game has a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome from which we d...