We show that introducing an external capital market with information asymmetry into a product market model reduces opportunistic substitution of sub-standard goods and encourages producers to concentrate on long-run reputation building. We test this result with a laboratory experiment. We find that, when the problem of product market opportunism is moderate, i.e., reputation formation equilibri...

We analyze the optimal contract to finance the series of investments of a growing firm. The analysis is based on the need to repeatedly raise funds when informed insiders can expropriate outside investors. The optimal contract can be implemented by a sequence of one-period debt contracts and equity ownership by outsiders. Debt is optimal, as it reduces the expected cost of auditing, while parti...

Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we consider several possible determinants that may influence the choice of auctions versus negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the years 1995–2000. The analysis suggestsa...

This paper incorporates morale into a standard principal-agent model. When morale is observable, the agent’s effort level, the optimal piece rate, and the firm’s expected profits are all increasing in the worker’s level of morale. However, when morale is unobservable, workers shirk relative to the full information solution. The paper also considers a model of morale interdependence. The results...

In this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post e$ciency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a &simple' contract that the parties have written ex ante. This result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are ren...

Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden informa...

I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in whic...