In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal investment, consumption and life insurance for a wage earner who has constant relative risk aversion(CRRA)preferences. The wage earner can invest in zero-coupon bond, stock and life insurance, and can make consumption decision. The interest rate and the volatility of the stock are stochastic, which results in incomplete market. Besides, the labo...

This paper studies portfolio choice and pricing in markets in which immediate trading may be impossible. It departs from the literature by removing restrictions on asset holdings, and finds that optimal positions depend significantly and naturally on liquidity: When expected future liquidity is high, agents take more extreme positions, given that they do not have to hold those positions for lon...

Moody's endorses the Basel Committee's proposal to use banks' internal risk assessments to re®ne the Basel Accord's risk weights on bank assets and commitments. External risk assessments, such as Moody's credit ratings, will likely play a supporting role as direct inputs into banks' internal rating systems and as tools for benchmarking and validating those systems. However, the widespread use o...

Traditional risk-adjusted performance measures, such as the Sharpe ratio, the Treynor index or Jensen’s alpha, based on the mean-variance framework, are widely used to rank mutual funds. However, performance measures that consider risk by taking into account only losses, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR), would be more appropriate. Standard VaR assumes that returns are normally distributed, though th...

Money managers are rewarded for increasing the value of assets under management. This gives a manager an implicit incentive to exploit the well-documented positive fund-flows to relative-performance relationship by manipulating her risk exposure. The misaligned incentives create potentially significant deviations of the manager’s policy from that desired by fund investors. In the context of a f...

This paper investigates a fund manager’s risk-taking incentives induced by an increasing and convex fund-flows to relative-performance relationship. In a dynamic portfolio choice framework, we show that the ensuing convexities in the manager’s objective give rise to a finite risk-shifting range over which she gambles to finish ahead of her benchmark. Such gambling entails either an increase or ...