We study a cardinal model of voting with three alternatives where voters’ von Neumann Morgenstern utilities are private information. We consider voting protocols given by two-parameter scoring rules, as introduced by Myerson (2002). For these voting rules, we show that all symmetric Bayes Nash equilibria are sincere, and have a very specific form. These equilibria are unique for a wide range of...

We consider von Neumann – Morgenstern stable sets in assignment games with one seller and many buyers. We prove that a set of imputations is a stable set if and only if it is the graph of a certain type of continuous and monotone function. This characterization enables us to interpret the standards of behavior encompassed by the various stable sets as possible outcomes of well-known auction pro...

It has been known since the work of H. Markowitz (“Portfolio Selection: Efftcient Diversification of Investments,” Yale Univ. Press, 1959) and J. Mossin (Amer. Econ. Rev. 59 (1969), 172-174) that even an individual whose underlying preferences satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms will not choose over delayed (i.e., “temporal”) risky prospects in a manner which can be modelled as expected ...

Given a set of vector outcomes and the set of lotteries over it, we define sets of (a) von Neumann-Morgenstern representations of cardinal preferences over the lotteries, (b) mappings that yield the certainty equivalent outcomes corresponding to a lottery, (c) mappings that yield the risk premia corresponding to a lottery, (d) mappings that yield the acceptance set of lotteries corresponding to...

In an important paper, Amrita Dhillon [3] provided a multi-profile version of Harsanyi’s [5] single-profile theorem on utilitarianism. Like Harsanyi, she assumed that the social alternatives are lotteries. Individuals’ preferences satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) axioms, and have thus an expected utility representation. A social welfare function maps profiles of individuals’ preferenc...

The interpretation of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in voting games has been debated by most political scientists. The present paper addresses the issue in a model that consists of an in nite sequence of repetitions of the standard committee game. The analysis of equilibrium processes leads to the following conclusion: When voters are farsighted, an alternative is the limit of an absorbin...

Suppose F is a finite set of selfadjoint elements in a tracial von Neumann algebra M . For α > 0, F is α-bounded if Pα(F ) < ∞ where Pα is the α-packing entropy of F introduced in [7]. We say that M is strongly 1-bounded if M has a 1-bounded finite set of selfadjoint generators F such that there exists an x ∈ F with χ(x) > −∞. It is shown that if M is strongly 1-bounded, then any finite set of ...

The design of artificial decision-making systems must be founded on some notion of rationality. Conventional multi-agent decision-making methodologies, such as von Neumann-Morgenstern game theory, are based on the paradigm of individual rationality, which requires decision makers to take the action that is best for themselves, regardless of its effect on other decision makers. Relaxing the dema...

A major virtue of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, for example, in the theory of general financial equilibrium (GFE), is that they ensure time consistency: consumption-portfolio plans (for the future) are in fact executed (in the future) — assuming that there is perfect foresight about relevant endogenous variables. This paper proposes an alternative to expected utility, one which also delive...

We derive an inter-temporal theory, in the spirit of Kreps and Porteus (1978), of changing tastes and unforeseen contingencies from normative primitives by weakening the completeness axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Our agent can only partially order future decisions, yet desires inter-temporal consistency. Our formulation contrasts with existing literature in several ways: (i) the theory ...