We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using Proportional Fairness as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing the agents to be truthful in reporting their valuations. For the very large class of homogeneous valuations, we design a truthful mechanism that provides every age...

We investigate time consistency of monetary valuations, also called monetary risk measures or monetary utility functions. Through a number of recent research contributions, it has become clear that time consistency imposes strong constraints on families of monetary valuations conditioned on available information at different time instants. In this paper we add to these results by showing that c...

Bundle discounts are used by retailers in many industries. Optimal bundle pricing requires learning the joint distribution of consumer valuations for the items in the bundle, that is, how much they are willing to pay for each of the items. We suppose that a retailer has sales transaction data, and the corresponding consumer valuations are latent variables. We develop a statistically consistent ...

We consider auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. The seller chooses a mechanism which indicates for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid; it must also induce buyers both to acquire and to reveal truthfully their valuations. We prove a very general “full extraction of the surplus” ...

This paper proposes an algebraic way of sentence valuations in a semiring. Actually, throughout the paper only valuations in the ring of integers with usual addition and multiplication are considered. These valuations take into consideration both words and their positions within the sentences. Two synonymy relations, with respect to a given valuation, are introduced. All sentences that are syno...

Query auctions are iterative auctions in which bidders have to select in each round an action from a finite set. We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. Thus, when valuati...

I study an economy with sellers and buyers with unit supplies and unit demands. Both parties have valuations uniformly distributed on a unit interval. I quantify the inefficiency, compared to the Walrasian market, caused by a market where the agents meet randomly. There are several causes of inefficiency that I deal with separately. First, even if there is perfect information about valuations i...

I develop and test the theoretical predictions that when investor overreaction to marketwide news is larger, firm valuations in the cross section become more dispersed and stocks earn lower expected returns. Consistent with these predictions, measures of cross-sectional dispersion of firm valuations are negatively related to subsequent market and portfolio excess returns, especially for sets of...

Given a field K with finitely many valuations; does there exist an extension of K which at these valuations has a prescribed local behavior? The Grunwald-Wang theorem answers this question in the case of abelian field extensions. Originally developed for algebraic number fields in the context of class field theory, it has turned out that it is valid quite generally, for arbitrary multi-valued f...

This study investigates whether personal taxes are related to asset valuations. The effective tax rate of investment income fluctuated considerably since federal income taxes were introduced. The main result of the paper demonstrates that there is an economically and statistically significant relationship between asset valuations and personal tax rates. Stock valuations tend to be higher when t...