This paper examines the necessity of regulating the Iranian card payments system (SHAPARAK) based on the theory of two-sided markets. The expansion of the payment card system in recent years has arisen some questions regarding the role of all kinds of costs and expenses such as interchange fees, cardholder fees, merchant fees, and network externality in balancing the market. Since there is only...

A one-sided (resp. two-sided) shift of finite type of dimension one can be described as the set of infinite (resp. bi-infinite) sequences of consecutive edges in a finite-state automaton. While the conjugacy of shifts of finite type is decidable for one-sided shifts of finite type of dimension one, the result is unknown in the two-sided case. In this paper, we study the shifts of finite type de...

We study a one-sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer. We show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of possible outcomes when compared to two-sided private information. In particular, higher order beliefs can lead to a delay in...