An n-tuple is defined for each n-person monotonic characteristic function game, This n-tuple is an imputation when the sum of the components of it is equal to v( N). On the boundary of the set of all monotonic games" we can obtain a condition for the n-tuple being an imputation. The n-tuple belongs to the core when it is an imputation. If the sum of the components of it exceeds v( N), the kerne...

This paper deals with the approximation of Nash-equilibria in m-player games. We present conditions under which an approximating sequence of games admits near-equilibria that approximate near equilibria in the limit game. We apply the results to two classes of games: (i) a duopoly game approximated by a sequence of matrix games; (ii) a stochastic game played under the S-adapted information stru...

We develop an approach of variational analysis and generalized differentiation to conditioning issues for two-person zero-sum matrix games. Our major results establish precise relationships between a certain condition measure of the smoothing first-order algorithm proposed in [4] and the exact bound of metric regularity for an associated set-valued mapping. In this way we compute the aforementi...

Abstract. A two-person zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game of infinite duration with discounted payoff involving hybrid controls is studied. The minimizing player is allowed to take continuous, switching and impulse controls whereas the maximizing player is allowed to take continuous and switching controls. By taking strategies in the sense of Elliott–Kalton, we prove the existence ...

We concentrate on discussing a class of two-person zero-sum games with rough payoffs. Based on the expected value operator and the trust measure of rough variables, the expected equilibrium strategy and r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy are defined. Five cases whether the game exists r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy are discussed, and the technique of genetic algorithm is applied to find...

We consider the class of two-person zero-sum allocation games known as Captain Lotto games (Hart 2014). These are Colonel Blotto type games in which the players have capacity constraints. We consider the game with non-strict constraints, and with strict constraints. We show in most cases that when optimal strategies exist, they are necessarily unique. When they don’t exist, we characterize the ...