We study existence of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria (NE) in pure positional strategies in finite positional n-person games with perfect information and terminal payoffs. However, these games may have moves of chance and cycles. Yet, we assume that All Infinite Plays Form One Outcome a∞, in addition to the set of Terminal outcomes VT . This assumption will be called the AIPFOOT condition. Fo...

in this paper, a novel hybrid model based on neural network and game theory is proposed to support the analyzers in oil market. in this model, first the neural network is utilized to learn the oil prices associated with opec production level and usa imports level. then the learned neural network is applied by a game model. finally the nash equilibrium points of the game present the optimum deci...

In this paper, the problem of power control for cognitive systems is studied via game theory. The objective is to maximize the sum utility of secondary users (SUs) subject to the primary users (PUs) interference constraints, the transmission power constraints of SUs, and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constraint of each SU. In our earlier work, the problem was formulated as ...

This paper presents a novel coevolutionary model which is used to create strong game (The Virus Game) playing strategies. We use two approaches to coevolve Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) which evaluate board positions of a two player zero-sum game (The Virus Game). The first approach uses the coevolution with initial population of random ANN and second approach is a novel coevolutionary model...

Let us consider a financially constrained leveraged financial firm having some divisions which have invested into some risky assets. Using coherent measures of risk the sum of the capital requirements of the divisions is larger than the capital requirement of the firm itself, there is some diversification benefit that should be allocated somehow for proper performance evaluation of the division...

An infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent’s actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, admits a value. The proof relies on a representation of the game as a stochastic game with perfect information, in which Nature operates as a delegate for the players and performs the randomizations for them.

We consider finding maximin strategies and equilibria of explicitly given extensive form games with imperfect information but with no moves of chance. We show: 1. A maximin pure strategy for a two-player extensive form game with perfect recall and no moves of chance can be found in time linear in the size of the game tree. In contrast, it is known that this problem is NP-hard for games with cha...

In this paper, we address a cooperative game application to supply chain management. Specifically, we study a distribution system where a set of retailers may order for a single product from a unique supplier to satisfy a deterministic and constant rate demand of final customers. Each retailer, when ordering for a quantity of product, has to pay a fixed ordering cost and a transportation cost. ...

Given a prediction of opponent behavior in a general-sum two-player normal form game, it is difficult to select a strategy that balances the opportunity to use the prediction to inform one’s action with the risk of becoming predictable. We propose Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety (RSRS), a novel way of generating such a strategy. RSRS uses an r-safe Stackelberg equilibrium in a modif...

I experimentally test play in five indefinitely repeated games: a hawk-dove game, a game of chicken, a trust game, a coordination (stag-hunt) game, and a constant-sum game. I compare the different game histories that affect decision making in each of the games. I find that the common game history relevant to decision-making across all but the constant-sum game is consistent with the strategy ti...