Data-free quantization (DFQ) recovers the performance of quantized network (Q) without accessing real data, but generates fake sample via a generator (G) by learning from full-precision (P) instead. However, such generation process is totally independence Q, specialized as failing to consider adaptability generated samples, i.e., beneficial or adversarial, over resulting into non-ignorable loss...

The slow-coloring game is played by Lister and Painter on a graph G. On each round, Lister marks a nonempty subsetM of the uncolored vertices, scoring ∣M ∣ points. Painter then gives a color to a subset of M that is independent in G. The game ends when all vertices are colored. Painter and Lister want to minimize and maximize the total score, respectively. The best score that each player can gu...

(3) f(x) = (log x/log 2) + 0(1)? 1\Mloser and I asked : Is it true that f(2 11) >_ k+2 for sufficiently large k? Conway and Guy showed that the answer is affirmative (unpublished) . P. Erdös, Problems and results in additive number theory, Colloque, Théorie des Nombres, Bruxelles 1955, p . 137 . 2. Let 1 < a 1< . . . < ak <_ x be a sequence of integers so that all the sums ai,+ . . .+ais, i 1 <...

This paper considers an optimization problem of sum-rate in the Gaussian frequency-selective channel. We construct a competitive game with an asymptotically optimal compensation to approximate the optimization problem of sum-rate. Once the game achieves the Nash equilibrium, all users in the game will operate at the optimal sum-rate boundary. The contributions of this paper are twofold. On the ...

Game playing is one of the most important areas in AI. Chess is a very popular two-player strategy board game. In the context of AI, chess falls under the category of adversarial games where the opponent tries to reduce your chance of winning as much as possible. Being a classic example of a two-player zero sum game (sum of the utilities of agent and opponent is zero), the game of chess provide...

We have benefited from the helpful comments of Dan Kovenock, Wolfgang Leininger, and participants in the presentation at the CESifo Summer Institute Workshop on Advances in the Theory of Contests and its Applications. Brian Roberson Miami University, Department of Economics, Richard T. Farmer School of Business, 208 Laws Hall, Oxford, OH 45056-3628 USA t: 513-529-0416, f: 513-529-8047, E-mail: ...

While the idea of a matching pennies game may seem contrived, it is merely the simplest example of a general class of zero-sum games, where the total payoff of the players is constant regardless of the outcome. Consequently gains for one player can only come from losses of the other. For this reason, zero-sum games will rarely have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Examples would be chess, or m...