A sequential auction mechanism is proposed for sharing a wireless resource (bandwidth or power) among competing transmitters. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates sequentially discrete units of the resource via second-price auctions. It is known that such auctions can have inefficient equilibria. For two users with full informa...

In this paper, we consider multi-object auctions in which each bidder has a positive reservation value for only one special subset of objects, called a necessary bundle. In the auction, each bidder reports its necessary bundle and its reservation value. The seller solves the assignment problem of objects which maximizes its revenue and decides the winning bidders who can purchase their necessar...

Cognitive radio (CR) has evolved as a novel technology for overcoming the spectrum-scarcity problem in wireless communication networks. With its opportunistic behaviour improving spectrum-usage efficiency, CR enables desired secondary users (SUs) to dynamically utilize idle spectrum owned by primary users. On sensing identify frequency bands, proper spectrum-allocation mechanisms need be design...

Cognitive radio and cooperative communication are two new network technologies. So, the combination of these two new technologies is a novel solution to solve the problem of spectrum scarcity. Two main challenges exist in the integration of cognitive radio and cooperative communication. First, there is a lack of incentives for the participating wireless devices to serve as relay nodes. Second, ...

The number of Internet auction shoppers is rapidly growing. However, online auction customers may suffer from auction fraud, sometimes without even noticing it. In-auction fraud differs from preand post-auction fraud in that it happens in the bidding period of an active auction. Since the in-auction fraud strategies are subtle and complex, it makes the fraudulent behavior more difficult to disc...

In recent years, Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have been used around the world to allocate frequency spectrum for mobile telecom licenses. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for gaming or strategic bidding. In this paper, we show, however, that CCAs significantly enhance the possibilities for strategic bidding. Real bidders in telecom markets are not only interested in the...

In this paper, we study the auction model for resource management using the SimGrid simulation framework. We investigate three types of auction allocation protocols: (i) First-Price Auction, (ii) Vickrey Auction and (iii) Double Auction. The goal is to find which one is best suitable for the grid environment from users’ perspective as well as from resources’ perspective. The results showed that...

This paper simulates a 'service-neutral' digital dividend auction, considering three different amounts of spectrum (48 MHz, 80 MHz and 120 MHz). For this, an efficient simulator for combinatorial first-price sealed bid auctions has been implemented. The results show rather coherently that the price per lot is higher the smaller the amount of spectrum auctioned and that companies from the mobile...

In some auction domains, there is uncertainty regarding the final availability of the goods being auctioned off. For example, a government may auction off spectrum from its public safety network, but it may need this spectrum back in times of emergency. In such a domain, standard combinatorial auctions perform poorly because they lead to violations of individual rationality (IR), even in expect...