Dynamics of a social population is analyzed taking into account some physical constraints on individual behavior and decision making abilities. The model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, predicts that a population has to pass through a series of different games, e.g as a consequence of environmental fluctuations, in order to develop social cooperation and communication skills. It differs fro...

We study how group size a ects cooperation in an in nitely repeated n-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. In each repetition of the game, groups of size n ≤ M are randomly and anonymously matched from a xed population of size M to play the n-player PD stage game. We provide conditions for which the contagious strategy (Kandori, 1992) sustains a social norm of cooperation among allM players. Ou...

Introduction. In this paper we examine how cooperation can be supported by negative ties and triadic interactions. Previous research has demonstrated that cooperation is more likely to evolve in social dilemma games, such as the Prisoners Dilemma, if the game is played in networks [1, 4, 5, 12]. Besides sparseness [3, 4, 5], the structure of the network is also important because on top of direc...

Thesis: Macro-level social phenomena are implemented through the (social) actions and minds of the individuals. Without an explicit theory of the agents’ minds that founds agents’ behaviour we cannot understand and explain macro-level social phenomena, and in particular how they work. We will apply this to: social cooperation and its forms; team work and organisation; social values; social norm...