We present a simple model for examining the wealth distribution with agents playing evolutionary games (the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game) on complex networks. Pareto’s power law distribution of wealth (from 1897) is reproduced on a scalefree network, and the Gibbs or log-normal distribution for a low income population is reproduced on a random graph. The Pareto exponents of a scale...

We conduct an experiment in which human subjects repeatedly play each of six 2x2 games under one of two matching mechanisms. Under fixed–pairs matching, each subject is matched to the same opponent in all rounds of a game. Under random matching, each subject is equally likely to be matched to each potential opponent in any round. In both treatments, the games are played under limited informatio...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting …rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting …rms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic e¤ect is reversed...

This paper explores the quantitative relation between non random, assortative matching and the maintenance of cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics. We consider a population of individuals who are \hardwired” to play either cooperate or defect. They meet other individuals according to some random process and play their programmed strategy in a game of Prisoners’ Dilemma. The type tha...

The evolution of cooperative behaviour is studied in the deterministic version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma on a two-dimensional lattice. The payoff parameter is set at the critical region 1.8 < b < 2.0 , where clusters of cooperators are formed in all spatial sizes. Using the factorial moments developed in particle and nuclear physics for the study of phase transition, the distribution of coopera...

This paper examines the "bounded rationality" inherent in play by means of computing machines. The main example is the finitely repcated prisoners' dilemma game which is discussed under different models. The game is played by Turing machines with restricted number of internal states using unlimited time and space. The observations in this paper strongly suggest that the cooperative outcome of t...

We model the two-Wrm alliance as an iterated prisoners’ dilemma game with an exit option and test several theoretical predictions over two experimental studies. A new major eVect on alliance performance arises by including the exit option (i.e., the option to end the alliance and receive a Wxed payoV that is less than the payoV for mutual cooperation but greater than the payoV for mutual defect...

This study presents a modified version of the repeated discounted prisoners’ dilemma with long and short-run players. In our setting a short-run player does not observe the history that has occurred before he was born, and survives into next phases of the game with a probability given by the current action profile in the stage game. Thus, even though it is improbable, a short-run player may liv...

Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter incentives as in the classical prisoners’ dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers’ fees, each spouse has an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to ...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting …rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting …rms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic e¤ect is reversed...