We measure the welfare consequences of endogenous quality choice in imperfectly competitive markets. We introduce the concept of a “quality markup” and measure the relative importance for welfare of market power over price versus market power over quality. For U.S. cable-television markets between 1997-2006, we find that prices are 33% to 74% higher and qualities 23% to 55% higher than socially...

This article discusses the specific features of such a product as reactive power. The degree power compensation both in domestic electric industry and most industrialized countries is clearly insufficient. possibilities available grids, at plants consumers electricity for coordinated regulation voltage levels are not fully used. main factors influencing formation market revealed. proposed based...

In this paper we discuss the problem of power generation capacity adequacy in restructured and competitive power systems and analyse potential regulatory mechanisms to ensure sufficient supply of electricity. In particular, we look at how uncertainty influences the optimal timing of investments in new power generation capacity. We formulate the power generation investment problem for a decentra...

in order to improve the reliability of the power system, sufficient amount of new capacity should be installed in the network. usually generation units’ payoff in an energy market is not adequate to cover their expenses. therefore, energy only market cannot induce investors to invest in generation field. due to energy only market inefficiency, a supplementary algorithm is suggested to cover the...

Does Antidumping Protection Raise Market Power? Evidence from Firm Level Data* This Paper empirically tests the effects of Anti-Dumping (AD) protection on the price-cost margin of firms. To this end, we use a rich panel data set of 1,666 EU producers that were involved in AD cases initiated in 1996. Our findings indicate that price-cost margins in most cases significantly increase in the period...

This paper shows that the presence of intermediaries’ market power in decentralized asset markets reduces volumes traded and increases price volatility. I develop a method to estimate the degree of intermediaries’ market power from trading data and I apply it to the US municipal bond market using a new dataset containing all trades executed in this market. I find a high degree of dealer market ...