THEPURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to provide a description of the model of administrative behavior found in agency theory as contrasted with earlier models of administrative behavior, and to introduce new managerial accounting techniques that can be used to evaluate upperlevel administrators in a nonprofit organization such as a library. In addition, the article outlines several problems with the o...

We review the core issues in managerial accounting for radiologists. We introduce the topic and then explore its application to diagnostic imaging. We define key terms such as fixed cost, variable cost, marginal cost, and marginal revenue and discuss their role in understanding the operational and financial implications for a radiology facility by using a cost-volume-profit model. Our work plac...

Most sectors of industry, commerce, and government have reported variation in the performance payoff from electronic customer relationship management (e-CRM). In this paper we build on surprisingly sparse literature regarding the importance of managerial discretion to show that the heterogeneity of beliefs held by managers about e-CRM execution matter when explaining e-CRM success. Drawing on a...

This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue long-run viability of the firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control mechanism may not contradict shareholder value maximization. However, when the firm needs restructuri...

We investigate how managerial ability affects the intentional distortion of financial statements (earnings management). On the one hand, better managers receive a compensation premium for their perceived ability, and to the extent that earnings management would tarnish their reputations, we expect them to manage earnings less. On the other hand, better managers may be more able to extract rents...

This study provides evidence that managerial incentives, shaped by compensation contracts, help to explain the empirical relationship between uncertainty and investment. We develop a model in which the manager, induced by an incentive contract, makes investment decisions for a firm that faces time-varying volatility. In the model, a manager’s privately optimal investment response to a volatilit...

This paper examines endgame behavior, specifically the behavior of managers whose primary concern is to retain their jobs. Managers are taken to be of two types, good and bad, and only one manager is randomly selected as the firm’s first-period manager. The manager unobservably chooses the mean and standard deviation (limited by a mean-standard deviation frontier) of the process that generates ...

A widespread view is that executive perks exemplify agency problems—they are a route through which managers misappropriate a firm’s surplus. Accordingly, firms with high free cash flow, operating in industries with limited investment prospects, should offer more perks, and firms subject to more external monitoring should offer fewer perks. The evidence for agency as an explanation of perks is, ...

This paper is unique in its comparison of full programs, rather than a comparison of courses, as previously documented in Web-based education literature. Two similar MBA programs utilizing two different delivery formats (i.e., online MBA and on-campus MBA) were studied. The Learning Skills Profile (LSP) was used to assess the managerial skills when entering and graduating the programs. A compar...