Common pool resource systems are governed by a wide variety of institutions designed to promote long run resource viability. Relatively little work has focused on the use of majority rule voting in managing resource stocks. This paper develops a theoretical and experimental framework for assessing the efficiency of majority rule voting in allocating appropriation rights to a group of resource u...

We present a replication control protocol that provides excellent data availabilities while guaranteeing that all writes to the object are recorded in at least two replicas. The protocol, robust dynamic voting (RDV) accepts reads and writes as long as at least two replicas remain available. The replicated object remains inaccessible until either the two last available replicas recover or one of...

Analyzing voting on income taxation usually implies mathematically cumbersome models. Moreover, a majority voting winner does not usually exist in such setups. Therefore, it is important to mathematically describe those cases in which a majority winner exists, at least for the basic models of voting on income taxation. We provide a complete mathematical description of those income distribution ...

In the context of a probabilistic voting model, we investigate the consequences of choosing among voting rules according to the maximin criterion. We characterize the rules that satisfy the maximin criterion as a function of the distribution of voters’ probabilities to favor change. We prove that there are at most two maximin rules, at least one is Pareto efficient and often different to simple...

2 See, e.g., Stephen Deane, The ISS Institute for Corporate Governance, Majority Voting in Director Elections: From the Symbolic to the Democratic, at 1 (noting that advocates who favor majority voting in director elections view the issue as a “question of democratic principle” and, if implemented, majority voting “would transform the current symbolic process, in which shareholders can withhold...

It is well known that ex post e¢ cient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided. This paper instead considers majority voting with uniform cost sharing as the relevant status quo. E¢ cient mechani...

This paper presented a voting principle based on multiple classifiers. This voting principle was based on the naïve Bayesian classification algorithm and a new method based on nearest to class kernel classifier that was proposed. The recognition ability of each classifier to each sample is not the same. A model of each classifier was obtained by the training on the train data, which acts as bas...

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,”that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, b...