We show that every (random) assignment/allocation without transfers can be considered as a market outcome with personalized prices and an equal income. One can thus evaluate an assignment by investigating the prices and the induced opportunity sets. When prices are proportional across agents, the assignment is e¢ cient; when prices are common, the assignment is both e¢ cient and envy-free. More...

Directors of large corporations are sometimes compared, with considerable justice, to the supreme party council in a one-party state. Potentates of countries commonly regarded as dictatorial might look with envy on American corporate directors not only for the funds of money of which they dispose, but also for the security of their tenure.' But there are many ways in which directors are unlike ...

Envy is the unpleasant emotion that can arise when people are exposed to others with superior possessions. Common wisdom and scholarly opinion suggest that when people experience envy they may be motivated to obtain the others' superior possession. Despite the vast interpersonal, societal, and economical consequences attributed to this potential aspect of envious responding, experimental demons...

This article aims to correct the widespread imbalance in contemporary liberal thought, which makes explicit appeal to the “least advantaged” without parallel attention to the “most advantaged” as a distinct group in need of regulatory attention. Rawls’s influential theory of justice is perhaps the paradigmatic instance of this imbalance, but I show how a Rawlsian framework nonetheless provides ...

Researchers have very limited understanding of how continuous usage intention of social media (SM) are associated with online benign envy and individual-level culture. This paper addresses this gap and provides a theoretical framework to illustrate how manifestations of national cultural values at the individual level of analysis may influence SM use behaviors through online envy. We argue that...

We give a non-trivial class of valuation functions for which we give auctions that are efficient, truthful and envy-free. We give interesting classes of valuations for which one can design such auctions. Surprisingly, we also show that minor modifications to these valuations lead to impossibility results, the most surprising of which is that for a natural class of valuations, one cannot achieve...

We study a fair resource sharing problem, where set of resources are to be shared among group agents. Each agent demands one and each can serve limited number An cares about what they get as well the externalities imposed by their mates, who share same with them. Clearly, strong notion envy-freeness, no envies another for or cannot always achieved we show that even deciding existence such stron...