نتایج جستجو برای: iran provinces jel classification d63

تعداد نتایج: 616747  

2008
Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell Xavier Ramos

Inequality Aversion and Risk Attitudes Using self reported measures of life satisfaction and risk attitudes, we empirically test whether there is a relationship between individuals inequality and risk aversion. The empirical analysis uses the German SOEP household panel for the years 1997 to 2007 to conclude that the negative effect of inequality measured by the sample gini coefficient by year ...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2004
Martin Dufwenberg Georg Kirchsteiger

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in ...

2017
Nastaran Hajizadeh Ahmad Reza Baghestani Mohamad Amin Pourhoseingholi Sara Ashtari Zeinab Fazeli Mohsen Vahedi Mohammad Reza Zali

AIM To study the trend of hepatocellular carcinoma incidence after correcting the misclassification in registering cancer incidence across Iranian provinces in cancer registry data. METHODS Incidence data of hepatocellular carcinoma were extracted from Iranian annual of national cancer registration reports 2004 to 2008. A Bayesian method was implemented to estimate the rate of misclassificati...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2017
Claudia Keser Andreas Markstädter Martin Schmidt

In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair-share rule of equal contributions relative to one’s endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) may be influenced by minimum-contribution requirements. We consider three different schedules: FixMin, requiring the same absolute contributions...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2017
Bettina Klaus

For classical marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterized the core by same-side anonymity for marriage markets, Pareto optimality, consistency, and converse consistency. Nizamogullari and Özkal-Sanver (2014) generalized this result to the domain of classical marriage ...

2011
Asadullah M. Niaz M. Niaz Asadullah

Intergenerational Wealth Mobility in Rural Bangladesh Unique residential history data with retrospective information on parental assets are used to study household wealth mobility in 141 villages in rural Bangladesh. Regression estimates of father-son correlations and analyses of intergenerational transition matrices show substantial persistence in wealth even when we correct for measurement er...

2008
Sabrina Teyssier

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We show that the choice of the competition is negatively affected by disadvantageous inequity aversion ...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2010
Geert Dhaene Jan Bouckaert

We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma (SPD) and a mini-ultimatum game (MUG). Data on behavior and firstand second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject’s behavior as a material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none. We found that in both games the behavior of about 80% of the ...

2004
Björn Bartling Ray Rees Sven Rady Markus Reisinger

This paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if the investors have heterogenous preferences implying heterogenous bargaining behavior, and if these preferences are private information. In the hold-up problem, incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of the investments to be shared by bargaining. Fair-minded individuals reject positive but unfair offers even if this causes a bar...

2006
Daniel J. Benjamin Florian Englmaier Erik Eyster Dan Friedman John Friedman Roland Fryer Daniel Hojman Richard Holden Karthik Muralidharan Emi Nakamura Monica Singhal Jón Steinsson Jeremy Tobacman Stephen Weinberg

When contracting is not possible, a preference for fair exchange can generate efficient exchange, fully exhausting the potential gains from trade — or no exchange at all, leaving all gains from trade unexploited. A profit-maximizing firm offers a wage to a fair-minded worker, who then chooses how much effort to exert. The Rotten Firm theorem says: if the worker cares sufficiently about fairness...

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