In this paper, we present a novel annotation paradigm with an emphasis on two facets – (a) semantic propagation and (b) an end user experience that provides insight. We attempt to propagate semantics of the annotations, by using WordNet, and low-level features extracted from the images. We introduce novel semantic dissimilarity measures, and propagation frameworks. The system also provides insi...

P ho to b y C O LI N A N D E R S O N /T he I m ag e B an k M any executives of medical technology companies count on incentive compensation plans to align their sales representatives’ goals with the goals of the company, but this oftentimes isn’t the result. Some very common types of incentive plans, when coupled with poorly balanced sales territories, can actually hinder a medtech company’s ab...

We consider ranking and recommendation systems based on user feedback. We make a case for sharing the revenue generated by such systems with users as incentive to provide useful feedback. Our main contribution are mechanisms for ranking/recommendation which gives incentive for the users to provide useful feedback and is resistant to selfish/malicious behavior (click spam). The mechanisms are de...

We look at a principal–agent model in which the agent has to perform an action, the difficulty of which is better known ex interim than ex ante. We compare two contracting regimes; one with commitment to an ex ante negotiated contract, and one with an ex interim negotiated contract. The ex ante contract can not be too steep, but attempts to negotiate a steeper ex interim contract may result in ...

Understanding multi-dimensional mechanism design. 1 The Model Let M = {1, . . . , m} be a finite set of agents. Every agent has private information, which can be multi-dimensional. This is called his type. The space from which an agent draws his type is called his type space. Let Ti denote the type space of agent i ∈ M . We assume Ti ⊆ R n for some integer n ≥ 1. Let T m = ×mi=1Ti. Also, denote...

Decentralized systems, like peer-to-peer and ad hoc systems, may address scalability through the handing of system operational mechanisms over to the entities forming the system, in an autonomous manner. This paradigm raises concerns, in particular with respect to the establishment of trust between such entities, to the stimulation of their cooperation, and to the fairness of their respective c...

This paper presents a theoretical view of imperfect market. It concludes that an increase in the price of products does not give any incentive to increasing production which shows the mechanism for upward trends in prices.

W develop and test an incentive-compatible Conjoint Poker (CP) game. The preference data collected in the context of this game are comparable to incentive-compatible choice-based conjoint (CBC) analysis data. We develop a statistical efficiency measure and an algorithm to construct efficient CP designs. We compare incentive-compatible CP to incentive-compatible CBC in a series of three experime...

It is common wisdom that individuals behave strategically in economic environments. We consider Fisher markets with Leontief utilities and study strategic behaviors of individual buyers in market equilibria. While simple examples illustrate that buyers do get larger utilities when behaving strategically, we show that the benefits can be quite limited: We introduce the concept of incentive ratio...

In economies with adverse selection, Arrow-Debreu contingent commodity contracts must satisfy incentive constraints. Following Prescott and Townsend (in Econometrica, 1984), an Arrow-Debreu economy is considered with a continuum of agents whose feasible sets are artificially restricted by imposing these incentive constraints. Equilibria in such an economy must be incentive-constrained Pareto ef...