We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods and identical marginal costs. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the socalled “Bertrand paradox” as well as its most general formulation to date. Our proof generalizes to asymmetric marginal costs and arbitrarily many players in...

We consider a Rebelo (1991) type model of endogenous growth in which the environmental quality positively affects the rate of human capital accumulation and the environmental quality itself is positively affected by human capital accumulation and is negatively affected by physical capital accumulation. We analyse the effects of taxation on the steady state equilibrium growth rate in this model....

We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occurring out of equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications: C62—Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium D51—Exchange and Production Economies D58—Computable and Other Applied Gener...

The existence of a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium in qualities and prices is investigated in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where quality improvements require a quadratic variable cost and network externalities operate. We show that there exists a parameter region where the incentive to predate at the quality stage prevents firms from reaching a pure-strategy non-coopera...

Inventory positions of two risk averse market makers are introduced into a Kyle (1985) type batch trading model and the effects are analyzed. An equilibrium is defined with participation constraint and incentive compatibility and it is characterized as γ-coalitional equilibrium. At the equilibrium the two market makers share the risk of clearing orders so that the aggregate pricing schedule bec...

We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each others’ actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of...

We[1] present estimates of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (EIS) for Iranian households using synthetic cohort panels based on household micro-data. Results show significant difference with the common values used in Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models which are originally based on estimated values for developed countries. We show that this difference has important ...

We show that a profit maximizing monopolistic intermediary may behave approximately like a Walrasian auctioneer by setting bid and ask prices nearly equal to Walrasian equilibrium prices. In our model agents choose to trade either through the intermediary or privately. Buyers (sellers) trading through the intermediary potentially trade immediately at the ask (bid) price, but sacrifice the sprea...

This research compares partial equilibrium and statistical time-series approaches to hedging. The finance literature stresses the former approach, while the applied economics literature has focused on the latter. We compare the out-of-sample hedging effectiveness of the two approaches when hedging commodity price risk using futures contracts. For various methods of parameter estimation and infe...

This paper presents a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions in the direction of higher payoffs, subject to random error. This process produces a probability distribution of players’ decisions whose evolution over time is determined by the Fokker-Planck equation. The dynamic process is stable for all potential games, a class of payoff structures that includes several widely studie...