We examine mechanism design with transferable utility and budget balance, using techniques we developed for the study of repeated games. We show that with independent types, budget balance does not limit the set of social choice functions that can be implemented. With correlated types and three or more players, budget balance is again not a constraint if no player has "too many" more possible t...

The concept of dividend in transferable utility games was introduced by Harsanyi [1959]. It offers a unifying framework for studying various valuation concepts, from the Shapley value (symmetric as well as weighted) to the different notions of values introduced by Weber [1988]. Using the decomposition of the characteristic function used by Shapley [1953] to prove uniqueness of his value, the id...

; A problem with the concept of the core is that it does not explicitly capture the credibility of blocking coalitions, This notion is defined, and the concept of a modified core introduced, consisting of allocations not blocked by any credible coalition. The core and modified core are then shown to be identical. The concept of credibility is thus implicit in the definition of the core. Conside...

In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache’s axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value ...

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the Shapley value. In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. So, ins...

A cooperative game with transferable utility {or simply a TU-game{ describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payo®s by cooperation. A value function for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of the payo®s over the players in the game. An alternative type of solutions are share functions which assign to every player in a TU-game its share in ...

The purpose of the paper is to introduce a new type of fuzzy matrix games: fuzzy constrained matrix games. A computational method for its solution based on establishment of the auxiliary fuzzy linear programming for each player is proposed. The approach based on the multiobjective programming is established to solve these fuzzy linear programming. Effectiveness is illustrated with a numerical e...

Tournament solution concepts, selecting winners based on a pairwise dominance relation are an important structure often used in sports, as well as elections, and argumentation theory. Manipulation of such choice rules by coalitions of agents are a significant problem in most common rules. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of randomized choice rules by coalitions varying from a single...

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors to every TU-game. Some solutions that are based on distributing dividends are the Shapley value (being the single-valued solution distributing the dividends equally am...

We consider various lexicographic allocation procedures for coalitional games with transferable utility where the payoffs are computed in an externally given order of the players. The common feature of the methods is that if the allocation is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We first investigate the general relationships between these allocations and obtain two hierarchies on th...