The bipolar view in preference modeling distinguishes between negative and positive preferences. Negative preferences correspond to what is rejected, considered unacceptable, while positive preferences correspond to what is desired. But what is tolerated (i.e., not rejected) is not necessarily desired. Both negative and positive preferences can be a matter of degree. Bipolar preferences can be ...

Cost efficiency measures the cost of resource by output production. While conventional cost efficiency models set targets separately for each DMU, There are cases where the Central decision making is seeking the above targets, and at the same tries to obtain the target of Min cost efficiency for the total consumption. in this paper we consider that there is a centralized decision maker (DM). In...

This article offers a brief comparative look at American and British jurisprudential pending selection reforms, and argues that American states could improve their appointive systems by incorporating modern personnel recruitment and hiring practices. To restore public confidence in the courts, people must believe that judges exercise legitimate authority, undistorted by personal or partisan pre...

We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed number  of candidates are to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants; the  candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded. Best responses involve votin...

In “The Logic of Campaigning”, Dean and Parikh consider a candidate making campaign statements to appeal to the voters. They model these statements as Boolean formulas over variables that represent stances on the issues, and study optimal candidate strategies under three proposed models of voter preferences based on the assignments that satisfy these formulas. We prove that voter utility evalua...

The paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strategic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. It...

We consider a family of exchange economies where consumers have multiprior preferences representing their ambiguity aversion. Under a linear independence assumption, we prove that regular economies are generic. Regular economies exhibit enjoyable properties: odd finite number of equilibrium prices, local constancy of this number and local differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices. Thu...