Two approaches to rationality characterize the understanding of management accounting and control: one descriptive, based on empirical research allowing for a variety versions rationality; other normative, explained undergraduate students through voluminous textbooks control predominantly idea formal rationality. Whereas descriptive approach is often presented as contrast normative approach, se...

We define weak and strong rationality of players in terms of dominance rather than expectation with respect to probabilistic beliefs. We also define certain subsets of strategy profiles as weak or strong non-probabilistic correlated equilibrium, analogously to correlated equilibrium. It is shown that the set of profiles played when there is common knowledge of weak or strong rationality is a we...

The strategy of this paper is to throw light on rational cognition and epistemic justification by examining irrationality. Epistemic irrationality is possible because we are reflexive cognizers, able to reason about and redirect some aspects of our own cognition. One consequence of this is that one cannot give a theory of epistemic rationality or epistemic justification without simultaneously g...

“Rationality” has played a central role in shaping and establishing the hegemony of contemporary mainstream economics. As the specific claims of robust neoclassicism fade into the history of economic thought, an orientation toward situating explanations of economic phenomena in relation to rationality has increasingly become the touchstone by which mainstream economists identify themselves and ...

The concept of bounded rationality is not well-defined. Several aspects of bounded rationality are discussed. Two different kinds of bounded rationality are distinguished. First, rationality may be bounded in the sense that the player cannot perform all the necessary calculations within the time frame of the game. This applies not only to numerical calculations but also to any kind of informati...

Models in the classical theory of games and in neoclassical economics normally assume rationality in the sense that agents have compete and transitive preferences. The paper labels this fundamental rationality and distinguishs two other sorts of rationality pertinent to the study of strategic interaction: individual economic rationality (IER) and effective rationality. IER is, we observe, chara...

This study investigated the trait emotional intelligence (trait EI or trait emotional self-efficacy) profiles of 512 students from five university faculties: technical studies, natural sciences, social sciences, arts, and humanities. Using the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire, it was hypothesised that (a) social sciences would score higher than technical studies in Emotionality, (b) a...

In his dissertation of 1950, Nash based his concept of solution to a game on the principles that “a rational prediction should be unique, that the players should be able to deduce and make use of it.” In this paper, we address the issue of when such definitive solutions are possible. We assume player rationality at least as strong as Aumann’s rationality. By formalizing Nash’s reasoning, we sho...

This paper examines different approaches to rationality in analytic philosophy and AI, in the light of Bermúdez’s proposal that a full account of rationality must aim to explain how agents can both select and explain actions, as well as assessing them against some normative standard. We briefly survey instrumental, linguistic and discursive accounts of rationality, and conjecture that Habermas’...

rationality of religious belief is one of the most important issues in the philosophy of religion and includes five epistemological approaches. up till recent times, evidentialism was the approach prevalent in the field of rationality of religious beliefs. and it was considered as a symbol of maximal rationalism. reformed epistemology, however, is a newly-emerged school which opposes evidential...