Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite different arguments from vagueness of composite objects conclusion that I am not a physical object at all. One them, developed over course several chapters, takes following form: All (and only are candidates be human being) non-fundamental; non-fundamental things inevitably vague in various ways; this shows w...

Some current positions in the philosophy of mind, while ostensibly non-reductive, are in fact reductivist in ways that are seriously problematic. An example is found in the “naturalistic dualism” of David Chalmers: by maintaining the causal closure of the physical domain, Chalmers makes the rationality of conscious experience inexplicable. This can only be remedied by abandoning causal closure ...

Whether, or how far, acupuncture effects can be explained as due to the placebo response is clearly an important issue, but there is an underlying philosophical assumption implicit in much of the debate, which is often ignored. Much of the argument is cast in terms which suggest that there is an immaterial mind hovering above the brain and giving rise to spurious effects. This model derives fro...

(p. 258). That this could take on the functions of the soul was recognized (and welcomed). Francois Azouvi examines the work of Pierre Cabanais. Drawing from his predecessors, Cabanais distinguished physical man from moral or interior man, whose nature resides in the brain. Since the brain acts upon the other organs, then the physical/moral relationship is essentially physical (p. 272). This ne...