The interest in practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) is steadily growing. However, there is still a need to give a precise security statement which adapts to realistic implementation. In this paper I give the effective key rate we can obtain in a practical setting within the scenario of security against individual attacks by an eavesdropper. It illustrates previous result...

We derive a proof of security for the differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol under the assumption that Eve is restricted to individual attacks. The security proof is derived by bounding the average collision probability, which leads directly to a bound on Eve’s mutual information on the final key. The security proof applies to realistic sources based on pulsed coherent light...

Multisender authentication code was firstly constructed by Gilbert et al. [1] in 1974. Multisender authentication system refers towho a groupof senders, cooperatively send amessage to a receiver; then the receiver should be able to ascertain that the message is authentic. About this case, many scholars and researchers had made great contributions to multisender authentication codes, such as [2–...

BB84 protocol of quantum key distribution had been proved to be absolutely secure. We simulate the rate of secure key distribution in dephasing channel on a classical computer with the method of event-by-event simulation. Theoretically, the private classical capacity of dephasing channel can be obtained in principle, since the channel is degradable. We give the formula of capacity with respect ...

S. Krapick,1,* M. S. Stefszky,1 M. Jachura,1,2 B. Brecht,1 M. Avenhaus,1,3 and C. Silberhorn1,3 1Department of Physics, University of Paderborn, Warburger Str. 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany 2Faculty of Physics, University of Warsaw, Hoża 69, 00-681 Warsaw, Poland 3Max-Planck-Institute for the Science of Light, Günther-Scharowsky-Str. 1, 91058 Erlangen, Germany (Received 25 September 2013; publi...

• Quantum key distribution (BB84 protocol) • The goal of security proof • A very short course of quantum mechanics • Proving the security of QKD via complementarity • Basic idea • Small imperfections • A prescription for proving the security • The security of the BB84 protocol • Merits in the complementarity approach

Decoy state protocols have recently been proposed as an innovative approach to improve dramatically the performance of quantum key distribution systems. Here, we present the first experimental demonstration of decoy state quantum key distribution, over 15km of Telecom fibers.

This paper concerns sensor network key distribution schemes (KDS) based on symmetric-key techniques. We analyze the problem of active attacks against such schemes. By active attacks we mean those attacks, where the adversary can maliciously disturb the communication between the sensors. We observe that the active adversary that captured even a small number of sensors, can anyway get a full cont...

We consider attacks on two-way quantum key distribution protocols in which an undetectable eavesdropper copies all messages in the message mode. We show that under the attacks, there is no disturbance in the message mode and that the mutual information between the sender and the receiver is always constant and equal to one. It follows that recent proofs of security for two-way protocols cannot ...

Controlled complementary measurements are key to quantum key distribution protocols, among many other things. We axiomatize controlled complementary measurements within symmetric monoidal categories, which provides them with a corresponding graphical calculus. We study the BB84 and Ekert91 protocols within this calculus, including the case where there is an interceptresend attack.