We describe the maximum efficient subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for a player in the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, as a function of the discount factor. For discount factors above a critical level, every efficient, feasible, individually rational payoff profile can be sustained. For an open and dense subset of discount factors below the critical value, the maximum efficient payoff is not an ...

Desharnais, Gupta, Jagadeesan and Panangaden introduced a family of behavioural pseudometrics for probabilistic transition systems. These pseudometrics are a quantitative analogue of probabilistic bisimilarity. Distance zero captures probabilistic bisimilarity. Each pseudometric has a discount factor, a real number in the interval (0, 1]. The smaller the discount factor, the more the future is ...

In the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, when every player has a different discount factor, the grim-trigger strategy is an equilibrium if and only if the discount factor of each player is higher than some threshold. What happens if the players have incomplete information regarding the discount factors? In this work we look at repeated games in which each player has incomplete information regarding ...

We analyze how to value future costs and benefits when they must be discounted relative to the present. We introduce the subject for the nonspecialist and take into account the randomness of the economic evolution by studying the discount function of three widely used processes for the dynamics of interest rates: Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, Feller, and log-normal. Besides obtaining exact expressions fo...