We study a bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous agenda. In the procedure, proposals must be made on only one issue at a time, although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table. When bargaining frictions are small, there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements, including ones with delay. However, equilibrium payoffs cannot...

We introduce the moonlighting game. Player A can take money from or pass money to player B, who can either return money or punish player A. Thus, our game allows to study both positively and negatively reciprocal behaviour. One-shot experiments were conducted with and without the possibility of making non-binding contracts beforehand. We find that retribution is much more compelling than recipr...

While face-to-face bargaining has proven itself to be extremely efficient in the laboratory, it appears to break down often in the real world. This discrepancy, we assert, is explained by the fact that in the real world face-to-face bargaining is usually conducted not between principals but between the agents of principals. We find a substantial increase in inefficiency when bargaining is condu...

In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerably shape negotiation behavior. By using the novel setup of a ‘bargaining with claims’ experiment we provide new systematic evidence tracking ...

In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and establish their existence. We show that...

This paper studies whether psychological considerations can prevent agents from adopting potentially Pareto improving innovations. In the innovation game without the sharing option, A chooses whether to introduce an innovation that increases A’s payoff, but reduces B’s payoff, relative to “status quo” payoffs. B then decides whether to accept or reject the innovation. The unique subgame perfect...

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso–Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still ...

We introduce ill will among the players of the classic two-sided assignment game of Shapley and Shubik, by letting each player’s utility be negatively correlated with the payoff of all players in his group. The new game is very complex, but under a certain assumption of bounded rationality we derive a straightforward notion of stable outcomes as certain conjectural equilibria. We prove that sev...

A buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time. Each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option, abandoning their search or moving on to another seller. We show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price, contravening the Coase conjecture. We then embed the singlesel...

We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by decomposing the problem into sequences of subproblems. Combined with additional standard properties, it leads ...