This paper investigates algorithmic computability of simple games (voting games). It shows that (i) games with a finite carrier are computable, (ii) computable games have both finite winning coalitions and cofinite losing coalitions, and (iii) computable games violate any conceivable notion of anonymity, including finite anonymity and measurebased anonymity. The paper argues that computable gam...

We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credibl...

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. Resumen. Este trabajo propone un mecanismo que implementa aproximadamente el conjunto de negociación de Mas-Colell en equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos. El ...

We study a setting where imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoners’ Dilemma game. A well known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching: players that belong to a pair where both parties cooperate repeat partner next period whilst all other play...

We consider a three-stage game in which symmetric firms decide whether to invest in a cost-reducing technology, then they have the possibility to merge (forming coalitions), and eventually, in the third stage, a Cournot oligopoly game is played by the resulting firms (coalitions). We show that, contrary to the existing literature, the monopoly market structure may fail to form even when the num...

We consider the problem of efficiently sharing water from a river among a group of satiable agents. Since each agent’s benefit function exhibits a satiation point, the environment can be described as a cooperative game with externalities. We show that the downstream incremental distribution is the unique distribution which both is fair according to the “aspiration welfare” principle and satisfi...

Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implications of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard axioms of efficiency and strict individual rationality, they imply rationalizability of solutions to no...

A stable market structure is a partition of the firms in an industry such that there is no incentive for any breakups or mergers. Characterizing such stability requires an endogenization of both the core and Cournot equilibrium as well as all hybrid equilibria. This paper solves for the stable partitions in a general oligopoly by providing a tractable condition: a partition is stable if and onl...

A pure hedonic game describes the situation where player’s utility depends only on the identity of the members of the group he belongs to. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of core-partition in hedonic games. The condition is based on a new concept of balancedness, called pivotal balancedness. Pivotal balancedness involves especially the notion pivotal di...

In this paper, we study cooperative games with coalition structures. We show that a solution concept which applies the Shapley value to games interand intra-coalitions and in which the pure surplus that the coalition obtains is allocated among the intra-coalition members in egalitarian way, is axiomatized by modified axioms on null players and symmetric players and the usual three axioms: Effic...