نتایج جستجو برای: bribery

تعداد نتایج: 692  

Journal: :CoRR 2017
Robert Bredereck Piotr Faliszewski Rolf Niedermeier Piotr Skowron Nimrod Talmon

A classic result of Lenstra [Math. Oper. Res. 1983] says that an integer linear program can be solved in fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) time for the parameterization by the number of variables. We extend this result by incorporating piecewise linear convex or concave functions to our (mixed) integer programs. This general technique allows us to analyze the parameterized complexity of a number ...

Journal: :Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 2012

Journal: :European Business Organization Law Review 2021

Abstract Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) provide an alternative enforcement tool to tackle economic crime. Prosecutors tailor punishment and remediation measures more accurately satisfy the principles of prosecution. The companies in question can avoid criminal charges, provided that they comply with agreed terms conditions. use DPAs is conducive relieving collateral consequences, while ...

Journal: :Cuestiones políticas 2021

The purpose of the research is devoted to criminological description and explanation state illegal influence on results official sports competitions in Ukraine. A reading high level latency crimes according article 369-3 Criminal Code Ukraine, evidence that it at least 99% its real level. structure match manipulation was revealed analyzed type sport, method competitions, as well subjects briber...

2006
Marek Chrobak Claire Kenyon John Noga Neal E. Young

Following Mettu and Plaxton [15, 16], we study online algorithms for the k-medians problem. Such an algorithm must produce an incremental sequence F1 ⊆ F2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Fn ⊆ F of sets of facilities. Mettu and Plaxton show that online metric medians has a (roughly) 40-competitive deterministic polynomial-time algorithm. We give improved algorithms, including a (24 + ǫ)competitive deterministic polyn...

Journal: :Advances in Complex Systems 2010
Ana L. C. Bazzan Silvio R. Dahmen

In public goods games, individuals contribute to create a benefit for a group. However this attracts free-riders, who enjoy the benefits without necessarily contributing. Nonetheless, in real-life scenarios cooperation does not collapse. Several explanations have been proposed in order to explain this phenomenon, such as punishment and signaling. In the present work, we investigate the effects ...

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