As a result of public outrage over lower prescription drug prices in Canada, Congress passed legislation that would allow these drugs to be imported into the US. The lower Canadian prices reflect price regulation. Opponents of allowing these imports have argued that the US will import Canadian price controls and that profits of pharmaceutical companies will be hurt. In this paper, a model is de...

The formal literature on international conflict has identified the combination of uncertainty and the incentive to misrepresent private information as a central cause of war. But there is a fundamental problem with using game-theoretic models to formulate general claims such as these—whether and to what extent a result that holds in a particular choice of game form continues to hold when differ...

Game Theory has proven to be a useful tool for modelling decision problems in competitive and collaborative environments. Cooperative games, in turn, promote the bargaining and the formation of coalitions, and deals with problems as the redistribution of gained payo between members of coalitions. This paper introduces the concept of indistinguishability among players, providing constructive met...

Results of ultimatum bargaining experiments show a persistence of behavior that deviates from Nash equilibrium predictions. In addition to strategic considerations, many have attributed these results to a taste for fairness on the part of subjects. We investigate this concept by introducing an outside option for proposers in the game. We find that the outcome of the experiment varies systematic...

We propose a bargaining process as a way of playing and solving non cooperative games. We focus on social dilemma situations and show that sequential proposals which, if confirmed by players, determine real play, may give rise to equilibrium outcomes which differ from the standard non cooperative solution. Specifically, we show that, under standard assumptions, in a prisoners’ dilemma with conf...

In this paper, we propose a game theoretical model for joint scheduling and radio resource allocation in the downlink of a Long Term Evolution system, where Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access is used as the multiple access scheme. The context is that of spectrum sharing, with multiple users competing for the simultaneous access to the radio channel. We first give a layered system rep...

In societies with high cooperation demands, implicit consensus on social norms enables successful human coexistence. Mimicking other people's actions and emotions has been proposed as a means to synchronize behaviour, thereby enhancing affiliation. Mimicry has long been thought to be reflexive, but it has recently been suggested that mimicry might also be motivationally driven. Here, we show du...

We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are dela...

When there is a dispute between players on how to divide multiple divisible assets, how should it be resolved? In this paper we introduce a multi-asset game model that enables cooperation between multiple agents who bargain on sharing K assets, when each player has a different value for each asset. It thus extends the sequential discrete Raiffa solution and the Talmud rule solution to multi-ass...

When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rul...