We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are “strategically equivalent” if, for every player, the payoff differences between two strategies (holding other players’ strategies fixed) are identical. A zero-sum equivalent game is a game that is st...

We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game—a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically equivalent to a common interest game. We present a unified framework applicable for both potential and zero-sum equivalent games by deriving a simple but useful char...

Dans un jeu stochastique à somme nulle, chaque étape, deux joueurs adversaires prennent des décisions et reçoivent paiement d’étape déterminé par ces décisions, ainsi que une variable aléatoire contrôlée qui représente l’état de la nature. Le total est escomptée normalisée paiements d’étape. cet article, nous résolvons conjecture du “paiement constant”, formulée Sorin, Venel Vigeral (Sankhya A ...

A mixed strategy, a strategy of unpredictable actions, is applicable to business, politics, and sports. Playing strategies, however, poses challenge, as the game theory involves calculating probabilities executing random actions. I test i.i.d. hypotheses Nash equilibrium with simplest experiments in which student participants play zero-sum games multiple iterations possibly figure out optimal (...