For f a weighted voting scheme used by n voters to choose between two candidates, the n Shapley-Shubik Indices (or Shapley values) of f provide a measure of how much control each voter can exert over the overall outcome of the vote. Shapley-Shubik indices were introduced by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 [SS54] and are widely studied in social choice theory as a measure of the “influen...

We study the power index voting game design problem for weighted voting games: the problem of finding a weighted voting game in which the power of the players is as close as possible to a certain target distribution. Our goal is to find algorithms that solve this problem exactly. Thereto, we consider various subclasses of simple games, and their associated representation methods. We survey algo...

In many circumstances where multiple agents need to make a joint decision, voting is used to aggregate the agents’ preferences. Each agent’s vote carries a weight, and if the sum of the weights of the agents in favor of some outcome is larger than or equal to a given quota, then this outcome is decided upon. The distribution of weights leads to a certain distribution of power. Several ‘power in...

A new associative classification algorithm based on weighted voting (ACWV) is presented. ACWV takes advantage of two methods: the optimal rule method preferring high-quality rules and the voting method considering the majority of the rules. Moreover, the method takes into account both the length and convictions of rules to calculate their weights. First, ACWV builds a class-count FPtree (called...

Finger vein verification has developed a lot since its first proposal, but there is still not a perfect algorithm. It is proved that algorithms with the same overall accuracy may have different misclassified patterns. We could make use of this complementation to fuse individual algorithms together for more precise result. According to our observation, algorithm has different confidence on its d...

An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere behaviour. Manipulative behaviour has received increased attention since the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We examine the computational complexity of manipulation in weighted voting games which are ubiquitous mathematical models used in economics, political science, neuro...

This paper presents a decentralized variant of David Gifford's classic weighted-voting scheme for managing replicated data. Weighted voting offers a familiar consistency model and supports on-line replica reconfiguration. These properties make it a good fit for applications in the pervasive computing domain. By distributing versioned metadata along with data replicas, and managing access to bot...

Previous papers reported the effectiveness in classification of cancers with their gene expression portraits [1, 2, 3]. Golub et al. [3] selected 50 genes of high predictive value to differentiate 2 types of leukemia by ‘weighted voting algorithm’. However it remains to be known whether we can apply this type of specific algorithms to classify different types of cancer. We, therefore, attempted...