shareholders of joint stock companies have several rights. the most typical categorization of shareholders' right is financial and non-financial right. every one's intention of investing in commercial companies is to make profit; hence, the most important right of shareholders is to enjoy the dividend of the company. this right is a financial one. furthermore, after dissolution of the...

We examine the effects o subscription behavior and wealth transferring controlled by larger shareholders on price discount of private placement. Price discount of private placement and wealth transferring effect exhibits a significant trend when larger shareholders subscribe more private placement shares. Shares proportion subscribed by larger shareholders, shares size of private placement and ...

Activist shareholders have lately been attempting to assert themselves in a struggle with management and regulators over control of corporate decisions. These efforts have met with mixed success. Meanwhile, shareholders have been pressing for changes in the rules governing access to the corporate proxy process, especially in regard to nominating directors. The key issue which these events have ...

We consider a firm acting strategically on behalf of its shareholders. The price normalization problem arising in general equilibrium models of imperfect competition can be overcome by using the concept of real wealth maximization. This concept is based on shareholders’ aggregate demand and does not involve any utility comparisons. We explore the efficiency properties of real wealth maxima for ...

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1. Supplementary analysis for the proof of Proposition 1: Proof that for any q, the equilibrium ws (0) = 0, ws (1) = 1, and w0 = 12 exists. Consider the decision of shareholder i with signal si when other informed shareholders (i.e., shareholders that acquired private signals) vote according to strategy ws (sj), and uninformed shareholders (i.e., shareholders that did not acquire private signal...

The rationale for issuing poison pill securities remains unclear, despite the findings of a large body of prior research that these defenses adversely affect shareholder wealth. This paper investigates the hypothesis that the adoption of such defenses may reflect shareholders’ desire to contract efficiently with their managers in an environment characterized by hostile takeovers and uncertainty...