Infinitists argue that their view outshines foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas foundationalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be complete. I present four different ways that foundationalists could make sense of those two features of justification, thereby undermining the case for infinitism.

Post-foundationalism as a theoretical perspective in the social sciences is based on epistemological assumption that world, no ultimate foundation exists. This volume aims to promote post-foundationalism and its relevance for geography, particularly urban studies. To achieve aim, it presents 15 thematic chapters structured across three parts, well […]

Epistemic justification has been claimed to be a special case of argument by philosophers such as Accordingly for each attempt, epistemic justification is the occasion of the arguer making a case for some conclusion based on other premises, when the audience and the arguer are the same person. The dialectical model of argument is used to inform how it is that a subject could come to justify her...

Abstract This paper contributes to answering the question how physicalism can be defined for a world without fundamental physical phenomena. In recent in this journal, Torin Alter, Sam Coleman, and Robert J. Howell propose necessary condition on physicalism. They argue that is true only if there no infinitely descending chain of mentally constituted I alleged faces counterexamples. An phenomena...

Abstract There has been an explosion of interest in the metaphysics fundamentality recent decades. The consensus view, called metaphysical foundationalism, maintains that there is something absolutely fundamental reality upon which everything else depends. However, a number thinkers have challenged arguments favor foundationalism and proposed competing non-foundationalist ontologies. This paper...

Most foundationalists allow that relations of coherence among antecedently justified beliefs can enhance their overall level of justification or warrant. In light of this, some coherentists ask the following question: if coherence can elevate the epistemic status of a set of beliefs, what prevents it from generating warrant entirely on its own? Why do we need the foundationalist’s basic beliefs...

My theory is a version of foundationalism. Foundationalism says that there are certain beliefs, the so-called "foundational beliefs," which we are justified in holding and which do not depend on any other beliefs for their justification. Perceptual beliefs, in my view, are foundational. Notice that the definition of foundational beliefs does not say that they do not depend on anything else for ...