In case that malicious or selfish user congests network, the traditional congestion control schemes such as ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) in TCP protocol could not control the pernicious congestion so perfectly as they protect normal traffic. In this paper, we propose a strong congestion-making traffic control scheme, which is capable of preventing malicious or selfish user from conges...

We introduce a class of finite strategic games with the property that every deviation of a coalition of players that is profitable to each of its members strictly decreases the lexicographical order of a certain function defined on the set of strategy profiles. We call this property the Lexicographical Improvement Property (LIP) and show that it implies the existence of a generalized strong ord...

In this work we address in-network congestion control. The proposed approach relies on a coupling between congestion control and routing. To reduce management and configuration complexity we put a strong emphasis on self-organisation based on the spontaneous phase synchronisation of pulse-coupled oscillators. We describe how groups of pulse-coupled oscillators can be used for congestion control...

Strong Nash equilibria and Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are natural and important strengthenings of the Nash equilibrium concept. We study these stronger notions of equilibrium in congestion games, focusing on the relationships between the price of anarchy for these equilibria and that for standard Nash equilibria (which is well understood). For symmetric congestion games with polynomial or e...

In congestion games, players use facilities from a common pool. The benefit that a player derives from using a facility depends, possibly among other things, on the number of users of this facility. The paper gives an easy alternative proof of the isomorphism between exact potential games and the set of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal (1973). It clarifies the relations between existing...

Bottleneck congestion games properly model the properties of many real-world network routing applications. They are known to possess strong equilibria – a strengthening of Nash equilibrium to resilience against coalitional deviations. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of pure Nash and strong equilibria in these games. We provide a generic centralized algorithm to compute stro...

A network congestion game is played on a directed, two-terminal network. Every player chooses a route from his origin to his destination. The cost of a route is the sum of the costs of the arcs on it. The arc cost is a function of the number of players who use it. Rosenthal proved that such a game always has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Here we pursue a systematic study of the classes...

in trading electrical energy in deregulated power systems, violation of operation constraints such as transmission lines flow limits is possible. these conditions have been called “congestion”. one of the most important responsibility of independent system operator (iso) is congestion management in a manner that all the system equipments be operated in their nominal ranges. in this paper, usi...

Non-recurrent congestion is frequently caused by accidents and other incidents. We estimate the causal effect of incident duration on drivers’ time losses through changes in non-recurrent road congestion on Dutch highways. We demonstrate that incident duration has a strong positive, but concave, effect on non-recurrent congestion. The duration elasticity of nonrecurrent congestion is about 0.40...

Different routing strategies may result in different behaviors of traffic on internet. We analyze the correlation of traffic data for three typical routing strategies by the detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA) and find that the degree of correlation of the data can be divided into three regions, i.e., weak, medium, and strong correlation. The DFA scalings are constants in both the regions of w...