For groups that must make several decisions of a similar form, we define a simple and general mechanism that is designed to promote social efficiency. The mechanism links the various decisions by forcing agents to budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems conforms to the underlying distribution of preferences. We show that as the mechanism ...

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to individuals. The individuals form a group as a single agent and share their private signals in order to maximize their average payoff. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) that restricts the message s...

We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different setting...

Existence of symmetric n-firm Cournot Nash equilibrium has been proven by [4] McManus (1964) and [7] Roberts/Sonnenschein (1976), later ones do not require concave profit functions. [14] Vives (1990), pp. 317 suggested a connection to Tarski’s fixed point theorem and sketched a proof in the framework of lattice theory and the theory of supermodular games. Further sketches of the proof can be fo...

In the last two decades, the classical Arrow and Debreu result [3] on the existence of Walrasian equilibria has been generalized in many directions. MasColell [35] has first shown that the existence of an equilibrium can be established without assuming preferences to be total or transitive. Next, by using an existence theorem of maximal elements, Gale and Mas-Colell [20] gave a proof of the exi...

For groups that must make several decisions of similar form, we define a simple and general mechanism that is designed to promote social efficiency. The mechanism links the various decisions by forcing agents to budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems conforms to the underlying distribution of preferences. We show that as the mechanism op...

We study Witten’s proposal that a domain wall exists in M-theory fivebrane version of QCD (MQCD) and that it can be represented as a supersymmetric three-cycle in G2 holonomy manifold. It is shown that equations defining the U(1) invariant domain wall for SU(2) group can be reduced to the Monge-Ampère equation. A proof of an algebraic formula of Kaplunovsky, Sonnenschein and Yankielowicz is pre...