We present a crowd model informed by common ground theory to accommodate high-level socially aware behavioral realism of characters in crowd simulations. In our approach, group members maintain group cohesiveness by communicating and adapting their behaviors to each other. The resulting character behaviors in animations form a consequential chain interpreted as a coherent story by observers. We...

We consider a model of cake-eating with private information. The model captures phenomena such as trust and “security of supply” in resource-use relationships. It also predicts supply shocks as an equilibrium phenomenon: privately informed sellers have incentives to reveal resource scarcity too late, through a supply disruption, after which they exploit the consumers’ inability to immediately a...

This study explores the hypothesis that age-related declines in inhibitory ability are associated with increases in socially inappropriate behavior. Consistent with this hypothesis, older participants were less likely than younger participants to differentiate between public and private settings when inquiring about potentially embarrassing issues, according to their peers. Additionally, this i...

This paper considers the needs of an ageing population and the implications for Human Computer Interaction (HCI) research. The discussion is structured around findings from interviews with medical and care professionals and older people. Various technologies are being successfully used to monitor for falls and other emergencies, and also to assess and manage risk. The design of this technology ...

Communication for informed choice is particularly challenging in clinical settings such as direct-entry midwifery, where the care model embraces diverse therapies and forms of knowledge. We identified three discursive moves (explanation, invocation, and evaluation) that Ontario midwives and clients used in making claims about proposed interventions. The analysis was informed by an understanding...

We study dynamic games with private information. After any history, signaling reveals information that helps players coordinate their future actions, but also makes the problem of predicting the informed player’s actions harder for the uninformed player. In equilibrium, the informed player may play aggressive or uncooperative actions, but his partner only tolerates a certain number of such acti...

ilona kickbusch’s thought provoking editorial is criticized in this commentary, partly because she fails to refer to previous critical work on the global conditions and policies that sustain inequality, poverty, poor health and damage to the biosphere and, as a result, she misreads global power and elides consideration of the fundamental historical structures of political and material power tha...