We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model this scenario by an influence game, a cooperative simple game in which a team (or coalition) of players succeeds if it is able to convince enough agents to participate...

Sufficiently frequent interaction between partners has been identified by, a.o., Axelrod as a more-or-less sufficient condition for stable cooperation. The underlying argument is that rational cooperation is ensured if short-term benefits from opportunistic behavior are offset by the long-term costs of sanctions imposed on the culprit. This argument does not require that these sanctions are (on...

The deenitions of cooperation to shared plans and joint intentionality have traditionally included subsidiary goals: they aim at coordinating the part of the group's action which goes beyond the control of individual intentionality. In this paper, we present a deenition of collective acting which explains goals aiming at the group's coordination as a result of the interaction of goal adoption, ...

Cooperation evolves on social networks and is shaped, in part, by norms: beliefs and expectations about the behaviour of others or of oneself. Networks of cooperative social partners and associated norms are vital for pastoralists, such as Saami reindeer herders in northern Norway. However, little is known quantitatively about how norms structure pastoralists' social networks or shape cooperati...

Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. There are normally two choices in the standard model of indirect reciprocity which works through reputation. Here we introduced the role of costly punishment into the model. The players could have the third choice besides cooperation and defection. The dynamics of cooperation in indirect reciprocity is analyzed unde...

Cooperation has long been an enigma in the life and social sciences. A possible explanation for the phenomenon is the recently developed idea of strong reciprocity in which agents altruistically reward those that cooperate and altruistically punish those that do not. The acts are altruistic in the sense that when agents punish or reward they incur a cost but receive no material benefit. Both ex...

The technological cooperation and technological innovation are not only the material and technological activities, but also the complex social process. The industry-university-research institute (IUR) cooperation cannot success without the social capital which is embedded in the cooperative members’ relation network. Based on the framework of social capital Nahapiet and Ghoshal concluded, this ...

We discuss the NLO evolution of quark transversity densities and of the parton distribution function for linearly polarized gluons in a linearly polarized hadron. A supersymmetric relation between the NLO evolution kernels for transversity and for linear polarization is found. We also study the implications of NLO evolution for Soffer’s inequality and the prospects of measuring transversity den...