It is widely reported in the literature that it is not possible to test nonmarket good preference restrictions against revealed preference. While it is clearly impossible to affirm any particular preference restriction as being “true,” it is possible to show that a preference restriction is not feasible. A revealed preference feasibility test for weak complementarity is presented here. With wea...

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Gul and Pesendorfer [9] model the static behavior of an agent who ranks menus prior to the experience of temptation. This paper models the dynamic behavior of an agent whose ranking of menus itself is subject to temptation. The representation for the agent’s dynamically inconsistent choice behavior views him as possessing a dynamically consistent view of what choices he “should”make (a normativ...

We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences) are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result “explains” classical revealed preference th...

Some assert that it is impossible to test preference restrictions against revealed preference. The “goodness” preference restriction simply assumes that one value of a nonmarket good is preferred over another other with any fixed commodity consumption. This paper uses a preference-theoretic methodology to show how goodness can be falsified by revealed preference for compensation-based welfare a...