Situations akin to public deliberation leading to preference changes are modelled. A set of agents is considered, each endowed with a preference relation over a set of objects and a reliability relation over the involved agents. Different ways in which the public announcement of the current individual preferences can influence the agents’ future preferences are studied. Special emphasis is give...

This paper examines the factors affecting Japanese attitudes toward immigration. Using individual-level survey data, we investigate impact of both economic/socioeconomic (cognitive) and noneconomic (or noncognitive) factors, latter including behavioral bias, communication skills, social stance subjective well-being. The results indicate that individuals are male, richer, more educated, younger ...

The paper examines preferences for product quality regulations. Our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods. The model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food. Results from a survey of consumers are consistent with the conceptual model and show that prefe...

Stimulation of cooperation when noncooperation appears to be individually rational has been an issue in economics for at least a half century. In the 1960's and 1970's the context was cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game; in the 1980's voluntary provision of public goods; in the 1990's, the literature on coalition formation for public goods provision emerged, in the context of coalitions ...

BACKGROUND Much attention in recent years has been given to the topic of public engagement in health technology assessment (HTA) decision-making. HTA organizations spend substantial resources and time on undertaking public engagement, and numerous studies have examined challenges and barriers to engagement in the decision-making process however uncertainty remains as to optimal methods to incor...

This paper studies the problem of providing multiple public goods for agents with single-peaked preferences. A decision rule selects m points for the m identical public goods for every pro le of reported preferences. In Miyagawa (1998c) these multiple public goods are options, i.e., alternatives are compared by the most preferred goods according to the agents' preferences. In this paper agents ...