This paper is an attempt to systematically present the problem of various N-person Prisoners’ Dilemma games and some of their possible solutions. 13 characteristics of the game are discussed. The role of payoff curves, personalities, and neighborhood is investigated. Experiments are performed with a new simulation tool for multi-agent Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Investigations of realistic situat...

By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners’ dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma is often achieved, with ”recirpocal” preferences. In the chicken game a symme...

The Prisoners’ Dilemma is perhaps the most famous model in the field of game theory. Consequently, it is natural to investigate its quantum version when one considers to apply quantum strategies to game theory. There are two main results in this paper: 1) The well-known Prisoners’ Dilemma can be categorized into three types and only the third type is adaptable for quantum strategies. 2) As a re...

We revisit the two-stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and asymmetric technologies of Sen and Stamatopoulos (2015). We show that their conclusions are misled by the restrictive assumption that the extent of delegation to managers is restricted to a binary set. Allowing for a continuous set of delegation incentives, we prove that the delegation stage is a prisoners’dilemma, the unique s...

The unique Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in groups is ostracism: players who defect are expelled. If the group’s members prefer not to diminish its size, ostracism hurts the legitimate members of the group as well as the outcast. putting the credibility of the threat in doubt. Nonetheless, ...

This paper studies the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with private monitoring for arbitrary number of players. It is shown that a mixture of a grim trigger strategy and permanent defection can achieve an almost e¢cient outcome for some range of discount factors if private monitoring is almost perfect and symmetric, and if the number of players is large. This approximate e¢cieicny result also holds...

The spatial prisoners’ dilemma is a useful model in stochastic game theory that can help probe spatial complexity classes and quantify macroscopic emergent properties. Repeated simulation experiments with different temptation payo↵ parameter values and with varying initial proportions of defector players indicate a detailed structure in phase space that exhibits sharp transitions regardless of ...