Competition policy in the banking sector is complicated by the necessity of maintaining financial stability. Greater competition may be good for (static) efficiency, but bad for financial stability. From the point of view of welfare economics, the relevant question is: what are the efficient levels of competition and financial stability? We use a variety of models to address this question and f...

Competition policy in the banking sector is complicated by the necessity of maintaining financial stability. Greater competition may be good for (static) efficiency, but bad for financial stability. From the point of view of welfare economics, the relevant question is: What are the efficient levels of competition and financial stability? We use a variety of models to address this question and f...

This paper is part of a larger research project on the evolution of the Perfect Competition concept in a historical perspective. We try to follow the changes this concept has gone through from the different alternative views during the so–called “Marginal Revolution” towards the consolidation of the price–taker hypothesis. Some recent theoretical developments have underlined the importance of g...

In this paper, we apply the theory of optimal control and theory of tra¢ c assignment for supply chain design in perfect competition. We model the time staging and generalized routing of input factors needed for production by a …rm. The production process will typically involve several stages, and as such is described by paths through a production network whose nodes are the various stages of p...

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.