Nominalists think there are no mathematical objects, henceforth, "numbers." Here is how the debate about nominalism has sometimes been presented. First there's the argument AGAINST, credited to Quine: numbers are indispensable to natural science, hence they exist. Then there's the argument FOR nominalism: they are not (indispensable) either, which leaves us no reason to think that they exist. I...

The idea of “material plenitude” has been gaining traction in recent discussions the metaphysics material objects. My main goal here is to show that this may have important dialectical implications for properties—more specifically, it provides nominalists with new resources their attempt reject an ontology universals. I will recapitulate one arguments against nominalism—due David Armstrong—and ...

Nominalism in formal ontology is still the thesis that only acceptable domain of quantification first-order particulars. Nominalists may assert second-order well-formed formulas can be fully and completely interpreted within domain, thereby avoiding any ontological commitment to entities, by means an appropriate semantics called “substitutional”. In this paper I argue success strategy depends o...