Our goal in this paper is to raise a general question about the relationship between theories of responsibility, on the one hand, and a commitment to conscious attitudes, on the other. The evidence from cognitive science suggests that there are no conscious mental states playing the right causal roles to count as decisions, judgments, or evaluations. We propose that all theorists should determi...

This article offers an introductory analysis of the philosophical and empirical considerations having to do with the significance of psychopathy, intellectual disability and ADHD regarding one’s moral responsibility. Moral responsibility comes in degrees and is ultimately determined on social grounds. Whether a certain diagnosis and its underpinning neuro-cognitive impairment affects one’s cogn...

This paper examines the moral education of the child with a critical attention paid to the allocation of responsibility. The paper tried to answer the question: ‘Who gives the child his moral education, is it a collective responsibility or the sole responsibility of an institution’? After the examination of some theories of moral development, attempt was made to examine the various institutions...

(Forthcoming, Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2009, Vol. 9, 3-4) ABSTRACT Many theoretical claims about the folk concept of moral responsibility coming from the current literature are indeterminate because researchers do not clearly specify the folk concept of moral responsibility in question. The article pursues a cognitive approach to folk concepts that pays special attention to this indete...

ISSN: 1354-6805 (Print) 1464-0619 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pcnp20 Moral psychology, vol. 4: free will and moral responsibility David E.J. Linden To cite this article: David E.J. Linden (2015) Moral psychology, vol. 4: free will and moral responsibility, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 20:5, 469-472, DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2015.1073470 To link to this article: http://d...

This paper explains the empirical markers by which Kant thinks that one can identify moral responsibility. After explaining the problem of discerning such markers within a Kantian framework I briefly explain Kant's empirical psychology. I then argue that Kant's empirical markers for moral responsibility--linked to higher faculties of cognition--are not sufficient conditions for moral responsibi...

This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter and outcomes are ...