Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is sup...

In Chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both „moral functionalism‟ and „analytical descriptivism‟. Here we argue that this metaethical position, which we will henceforth call „analytical moral functionalism‟, is untenable. We do so by applying a generic thought-ex...

Relativism and realism are often held to be in conflict. It is not obvious what the exact nature of the conflict is supposed to be, because it is not obvious what the two doctrines amount to. But that there is some kind of conflict between moral realism and moral relativism is evidenced by the fact that some take moral relativism to be the straightforward denial of moral realism. David Brink, f...

It is sometimes claimed that if moral realism is true, then rational and informed individuals would not disagree about morality. According to this line of thought, the moral realist is committed to an extremely substantive convergence thesis, one that might very well turn out to be false. Although this idea has been accepted by prominent moral realists as well as by antirealists, I argue that w...

*** In Press at Journal of Experimental Social Psychology *** Moral realism as moral motivation: The impact of meta-ethics on everyday decision-making Running Head: Moral realism as motivation Liane Young and AJ Durwin Department of Psychology, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Ave., Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Liane Young, Department of ...